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The Science of Unknowable and Imaginary Things 
 
An Invited Position Paper By 
 
Jack David Eller, 
 Community College of Denver 
 
Editor’s Note: The “Invited Position Paper” segment is a unique feature to SHERM journal 
where hand-selected scholars are invited to write their particular standpoint or attitude on a 
specific issue. While the position paper is intended to engender support for the paper’s line of 
reasoning and overall conclusion, the paper is not intended to be a simple op-ed piece. Rather, 
each essay must be academic in nature by deriving its position from verifiable data and/or the 
author’s training and experience as a scholar in a particular field of study. 
 
In this particular case, the author was asked to answer the following question:  
“Can the study of theology and/or metaphysics be classified currently or ever qualify in the 
future as a scientific endeavor? Why or why not? If yes, what criteria or methods would need to 
be in place and practiced to make them scientific? If no, what is it about ‘science’ that prevents 
theology and/or metaphysics from qualifying?” 
 
Abstract: In this paper, I address the question of whether metaphysics and theology 
are or can become science. After examining the qualities of contemporary science, 
which evolved from an earlier historic concept of any body of literature into a formal 
method for obtaining empirical knowledge, I apply that standard to metaphysics and 
theology. I argue that neither metaphysics nor theology practices a scientific method 
or generates scientific knowledge. Worse, I conclude that both metaphysics and 
theology are at best purely cultural projects—exercises in exegesis of local cultural 
and religious ideas and language—and, therefore, that other cultures have produced 
or would produce radically different schemes of metaphysics or theology. At its worst, 
metaphysics is speculation about the unknowable, while theology is rumination about 
the imaginary. 
 





CONSIDER THE ETHER. BASED on the discovery that light was or was like a 
wave, and on the understanding that waves of sound or water require a 
medium that is “waving,” nineteenth-century scientists hypothesized the 
existence of a light medium that they dubbed the “ether” (i.e. light was waves 
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of ether). It was predicted that the speed of light should be relative to the 
ether, just as the speed of sound varies as sound passes through air, water, 
metal, etc., and that the movement of the earth through this omnipresent ether 
should generate an “ether wind” that affects the speed of light. Although 
fiendishly difficult to measure, Albert Michelson and Edward Morley devised 
an experiment in 1887 using mirrors in various positions to measure changes 
in the speed of light through the hypothetically moving ether. Detecting none 
of the predicted changes, the Michelson-Morley experiment conclusively 
disproved the existence of the ether, and scientists then and since have 
universally abandoned the idea. 
 Consider now “substance” and “God.” For Aristotle and much of 
subsequent philosophy, substance is that which “stands under” (sub, stand + 
stare, to stand, to make or be firm) the things that we experience. It is what 
makes things what they are. Aristotle regarded substance as the “essence” of a 
thing, the “ultimate substratum, which is no longer predicated of anything 
else” and cannot be further reduced.1 Call it a hypothesis if you will, but what 
possible observation, measurement, or experiment could reveal anything of 
the nature of substance? How many substances are there—two á la Descartes 
(matter substance and mind substance), one á la Spinoza (which is equivalent 
to God), or more—and can we even know if substance exists? For traditional 
Christianity and related theisms, God is that which made and sustains the 
universe as omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and omnibenevolent. It 
regards God as the ultimate cause, which/who is not caused by anything else. 
Call deity, along with Victor Stenger, a hypothesis if you will.2 But what 
possible observation, measurement, or experiment could reveal anything of 
the nature of God? How many gods are there—one á la Christianity and other 
monotheisms, many á la polytheism—and can we even know if god(s) exist? 
 It should be obvious, given the contrast between the ether, substance, 
and god(s), what position I will be taking in this paper. On the question—are 
metaphysics and theology scientific, or can they be?—I answer with a 
resounding, no. Despite some feeble pleading on their part, neither 
metaphysicians nor theologians have practiced or can practice anything 
approaching a scientific method, nor have they produced anything 
approaching scientific knowledge (or arguably any knowledge at all). Indeed, 
                                                 
1 English translation appears in Aristotle, Metaphysics, W. D. Ross, trans. (London: 
Global Grey Books, 2018), 78. 
2 Victor J. Stenger, God: The Failed Hypothesis; How Science Shows That God Does 
Not Exist (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007). 








I will posit that neither metaphysics nor theology constitutes a search for 
knowledge but that each is merely an elaboration and refinement of language 
and, therefore, a purely cultural enterprise: different culture and language, 
different metaphysics and theology. In the end, my conclusion is that at best, 
metaphysics is talk about the unknowable and at worst, theology is talk about 
the non-existent. 
 All three of the key terms in our question—science, metaphysics, and 
theology—are highly contested with vast libraries of literature offering 
contrasting and opposing definitions and characterizations. We are not going 
to settle these matters in a short position paper, and any statement that we 
make here about each of them could and will easily be objected by someone. 




 In pre-modern parlance, “science” was a very broad and vague term, 
not unlike “philosophy” itself. From the Latin scientia for knowledge, 
knowing, or expertness (further from scire, to know, in the sense of to make 
distinctions, to separate one thing from another, literally to cut), by the late 
pre-modern era it referred to any corpus of knowledge or learning. Virtually 
anything could be called a science if the suffix –ology (words or speech) was 
attached to it, from astrology to demonology to UFOlogy. “Theology,” as we 
will see below and as everyone knows, means “words/speech about god(s)” 
and has been construed, in the pre-modern sense, as “science of god(s).” 
 As the modern era dawned, science came to have a more technical 
meaning. A representative and formative moment was Francis Bacon’s 1620 
Novum Organum (New Tool/Instrument). Asserting that “not much can be 
known about nature by the method that is now in use” (Book 1, §37) and that 
human minds are misled by myriad “idols” or “empty beliefs” received from 
tradition and authority, he insisted that “all the truer kind of interpretation of 
nature comes about through instances and well-designed experiments: the 
senses pass judgment on the experiment, and the experiment passes judgment 
on nature, on the facts” (§50).  Logic in the form of the syllogism is valuable, 
but the “naked hand” and the “unaided intellect” can only go so far without 
appropriate “tools” or instruments of evaluation (§2). 
 In Bacon’s insights are contained most of the crucial elements of 
contemporary science. Science is not just any old collection of claims, no 
matter how venerable or how widely and passionately held and circulated; 
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otherwise, every mythology, conspiracy, folklore, propaganda campaign, 
and other unsubstantiated set of sentences would be a science. Like pre-
modern scientia, science asks questions about reality and deposits a body of 
learning, a literature, from the proceedings of those inquiries. However, 
science is never merely, or even primarily, its literature. The books, papers, 
and essays of science house what we already know from prior scientific 
inquiries, but they are not where we turn to acquire new knowledge. The only 
source of new knowledge is the world around us. 
 Science must disregard, or at least suspend or bracket (in a Husserlian 
sense of the term), other would-be sources or bases of knowledge, including 
tradition, authority, popular opinion, subjective experience (i.e. some kind of 
privileged or mystical esoterica), and sacred religious texts. While those 
inputs may eventually be verified by science, they cannot be taken as a proper 
source for science. The ultimate, indeed the only, basis for the advancement of 
science is observation of the phenomenon in question—and not just 
observation casual or willy-nilly but sustained and systematic observation, 
probably over a long period of time and in excruciating detail. Imagine for 
example the painstaking efforts of Tycho Brahe (1546‒1601) in making and 
recording observations about the movement of stars and planets. 
 The careful observation of the world, rather than recourse to books 
and other received wisdom, leads to three other qualities of modern science. 
The first is quantification: in order to make meaningful observations, and to 
establish trends and relations, scientists invariably count and assign numerical 
values. Quantification also entails the application of statistics to determine if 
the observations, trends, and relations are more common than chance alone 
would anticipate.3 Second, as much as possible, scientists try to exclude 
extraneous variables by controlling observational situations—that is, they 
conduct experiments. Experiments are not the essence of science (some 
entirely reputable sciences like astronomy and anthropology really cannot 
perform them), but experiments are extremely powerful aspects of the 
scientific method. Third, as Bacon predicted, science enhances human 
observational capacities by the creation and utilization of instruments and 
devices, like telescopes and microscopes. Obviously, not everything that 
scientists want to observe is visible to the naked eye (or ear or other organ), 
                                                 
 3 For an example, see Stephen M. Merino, “Religious Involvement and Bridging 
Social Ties: The Role of Congregational Participation,” Socio-Historical Examination of 
Religion and Ministry 1, no. 2 (Fall 2019): 291‒308, 
https://doi.org/10.33929/sherm.2019.vol1.no2.10. 








which is why scientists deploy increasingly sophisticated Baconian organons 
to extend our perception (Marshall McLuhan was correct that every 
technology is finally an extension of the human body and sense organs). 
 “Seeing” is a basic way of collecting scientific knowledge, but seeing 
is only one version of detecting. We may not be able to see, for instance, 
protons decay, but we can detect in some fashion traces of such action in a 
supercollider. Science is thus literally “detective” work. This is why science is 
often accused of materialism, at least methodological if not epistemological. 
The accusation is not completely founded (science may study things that are 
not entirely material, like electromagnetic forces or the mind), but the bedrock 
point—if there is no conceivable way to detect a thing or its behavior, there is 
no way to know about it scientifically—is sound. 
 Everything we have said about science so far speaks of the collection 
of facts, which are the raw materials of science, but science is much more than 
a collection of facts. Science aims to accomplish three other, nobler goals. The 
first is the determination of causes (a metaphysical concept, perhaps), that is, 
the consistent and dependent relationship between phenomena; for this 
purpose, the isolation of phenomena achieved in experiments is invaluable. 
The second is the derivation of laws, that is, ideally mathematical statements 
of the relationships between variables, like Boyle’s law which establishes the 
mutual interaction of temperature and pressure or Newton’s law of gravity 
which equates the force of gravity to the product of the masses of two bodies 
divided by the square of their distance and then multiplied by a gravitational 
constant. Scientific laws are not normative or juridical like criminal laws (in 
that sense, “law” is an unfortunate choice of term) but simply descriptive. For 
example, there is no penalty for a gas or a planet that fails to obey these laws! 
 Still we have not reached the heart of science, which resides in the 
third goal—the “theory.” Although much maligned, theory is the highest 
attainment in science. A theory is not just any old kind of proposition, and it is 
far from a guess, a hypothesis, or an opinion, let alone a belief. A theory is the 
fullest and most powerful explanation that science can offer, and it differs 
from other kinds of answers in profound ways. Unlike other sorts of putative 
knowledge, a theory advances a mechanism to explain precisely how the 
premises and causes produce their effects (e.g. Einstein’s theory of gravity 
proposes the curvature of space, or atomic theory proposes how electrical 
charges and electron shells account for chemical bonds and reactions). A 
theory also necessarily makes predictions: if the theory and its mechanisms 
are correct, then certain things will occur under certain circumstances. If the 
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predictions of the theory are not borne out in experience, then there is a 
problem with the theory, which must be revised or rejected, as in the case of 
the Michelson-Morley experiment. Therefore, a theory is falsifiable. In fact, 
some philosophers of science like Karl Popper put falsifiability at the 
foundation of science: if a claim or theory is not in principle falsifiable, it is 
not scientific (which is why he and others discard Marxism or psychoanalysis 
as unscientific). Finally, a theory should be productive, in one or both of two 
senses. That is, it should be useful for producing additional knowledge (like 
the prediction of black holes in astrophysics), and/or it should be applicable 
for the purpose of inventing new technologies (like computers). 
 Some people attack science for its alleged uncertainty (e.g. scientists 
do not know for certain how gravity works, or worse that evolution is “just a 
theory”), but such criticisms are misguided. Certainty is not necessarily the 
best standard for knowledge claims (it is often more a psychological state than 
an epistemological one; that is, certainty is a matter of confidence rather than 
justifiability). More importantly, however, uncertainty is perhaps the driving 
impulse behind science. Because scientists are not certain about X, they make 
inquiries into X. They suggest a hypothesis—which is not a theory and is most 
definitely not a belief—and then set about to test that hypothesis. Scientists 
start from the position of skepticism about their hypotheses and about all 
received “knowledge.” According to the null hypothesis, a claim is false until 
proven true, and all claims are tentative no matter how well established. This 
is why we say that science is self-questioning and self-correcting: science is 
willing—no, eager—to test and abandon previous ideas (from the ether to 
phlogiston to spontaneous generation) and to question even its most basic 
assumptions. After all, no scientist makes their reputation by corroborating an 
old proposition or theory but by refuting it and substituting a new one. 
 Controversies aplenty remain. Is science the best or only way of 
knowing? Does science progress in a straight line of improved knowledge, or 
does it leap from one incommensurable Kuhnian paradigm to another? How 
socially constructed is science? Are social sciences like anthropology and 
sociology really scientific—or put another way, is physics the sole model for 
science? In the end, how closely does our scientific knowledge correspond to 
the real world? These questions are worth contemplating, but if science is 
anything distinct and worthwhile, it has the qualities that we have outlined 
above. For that reason, many ideas and literatures that have passed for 
science—or have speciously wrapped themselves in the cloak of science—are 
nothing of the sort. A clear example is “creation science.” Creation science 








fails utterly as science because 1) it conducts no actual or potential 
experiments; 2) it is totally non-quantitative; 3) it proposes no mechanism for 
creation; 4) it makes no predictions; 5) it is completely unfalsifiable; 6) it is 
unproductive (what can you use it for?); and 7) it never questions its own 
assumptions and conclusions. In fact, it has no desire to question itself. 




 For purposes of this essay, we assume that we are not talking about 
metaphysics in the sense of “metaphysical bookstores” and “metaphysical 
fairs,” with their offerings of tarot cards, crystals, oils and herbs, and magical 
paraphernalia like wands and chalices. It is not entirely facetious to raise this 
point since “metaphysical” has been so corrupted in the popular mind as to 
include the speculative, the mystical, and the downright wacky. Yet, this sense 
of metaphysics shares much with the philosophical sense of the “science” of 
metaphysics. Here, metaphysics as a philosophical project is normally 
attributed to Aristotle, although he never used the term; “metaphysics” (from 
meta ta phusika, after physics) was assigned as the title of his ponderings on 
what he called the “first philosophy” (prote philosophia)—first not in time, 
certainly, but in depth, as in “the first causes and the principles of things.”5  
He famously identified his first philosophy as the “science which investigates 
being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own 
nature” or what has come to be known as “being qua being.”6 One way to 
construe this obscure reference is to distinguish between specific beings (cats, 
trees, humans) and being-as-such, prior to and independent of actual beings. 
He continued, 
 
There are many senses in which a thing may be said to “be”… some 
things are said to be because they are substances, others because they 
                                                 
 4 Shockingly, though not surprisingly, the Intelligent Design (ID) movement’s star 
“scientist,” Michael Behe, has openly admitted in court that according to his (and ID’s) 
definition of a scientific theory, both astrology and “the ether theory of the propagation of light” 
are legitimate scientific theories. See the full transcript of the 2005 Kitzmiller, et al. v. Dover 
Area School District, et al. court trial at “Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District: Trial 
Transcript: Day 11 (October 18), PM Session, Part 1,” The TalkOrigins Archive, accessed July 
28, 2019, http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/dover/day11pm.html#day11pm315. 
5 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 3. 
6 Ibid., 47. 
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are affections of substance, others because they are a process towards 
substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or 
productive or generative of substance, or of things which are relative 
to substance, or negations of one of these things of substance itself.7 
 
Amusingly (but instructively), Helen Beebee, Nikk Effingham, and Philip 
Goff lament, “Most metaphysicians, however, are not at all sure what ‘being’ 
is supposed to be, and by and large avoid the term.”8 
 Although Aristotle introduced and examined many basic concepts, 
such as cause, element, nature, potency, quantum, affection, and so on, there is 
no doubt that his principle focus was substance, which included at least four 
forms—the essence, the universal, the genus, and the substratum.9 Elsewhere 
he designated three kinds of substances (the matter, the nature, and the “the 
particular substance which is composed of these two”).10 More fundamentally, 
he stated, “Some things can exist apart and some cannot, and it is the former 
that are substances.”11 We might also think of substance, and perhaps all of 
the topics of the first philosophy, as that which is not dependent on anything 
else, which cannot be defined by or reduced to anything else (i.e. primary or 
most basic). Or, flowing from the ancient Greek distaste for changing things 
and following The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, substance is that 
which does not change because it is eternally itself.12 
 If substance and being are “behind” or “beneath” the things we 
experience by sense perception, it stands to reason that we cannot experience 
them directly but only in their various sensible incarnations. On this basis 
alone, we could argue effectively that academic metaphysics does not conform 
to science (except in the pre-modern definition of scientia) any more than the 
offerings in a metaphysical bookstore do. If we cannot, in practice or in 
principle, observe or detect them, how can we possibly measure them, 
quantify them, test them, experiment on them, or potentially falsify them? 
How can we know anything about them? In regard to cause, of course, David 
                                                 
7 Aristotle, Metaphysics 
8 Helen Beebee, Nikk Effingham, and Philip Goff, Metaphysics: The Key Concepts 
(New York: Routledge, 2011), 15, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203835258. 
9 Ibid., 105. 
10 Ibid., 200. 
11 Ibid., 202. 
12 Peter van Inwagen and Meghan Sullivan, “Metaphysics,” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of 
Language and Information, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/. 








Hume long ago decided that we cannot, and the same would seem to apply to 
notions of substance, being, essence, and the like. 
 Fascinatingly, many professional metaphysicians appear to agree, 
including a number of textbook writers whom we presume would not want to 
scare away students and prospective future metaphysicians with inconvenient 
truths. For instance, Quentin Smith and L. Nathan Oaklander warned, 
 
The reader will not learn something in the same sense that she might 
in reading a textbook on chemistry or biology. There is no established 
body of knowledge in metaphysics….One reason for this difference 
between science and metaphysics is that scientific theories lead to 
predictions of observations that can be used to settle 
disputes….However, the subjects that are studied in metaphysics do 
not lead to predictions of observations and consequently, disputants in 
this field must rely on logical argument from premises and try to 
demonstrate logical fallacies in the argument of their opponent.13 
 
Equally stunningly, Peter van Inwagen, in his own metaphysics text, claimed 
that his field “attempts to tell the ultimate truth about the World, about 
everything,” but that after all its efforts, “There [is] no such thing as 
metaphysical information.”14 He continues, “There is no list of established 
facts the student … can be expected to learn (nor are there accepted methods 
or theories the specialist … can apply to search out and test answers to 
unresolved … questions).”15 Most damningly, he confessed, 
 
[If metaphysics] were suddenly to undergo a revolutionary 
transformation and began, as a consequence, to yield real information, 
it would cease to be regarded as a branch of philosophy and would 
come to be regarded as one of the sciences. It is, in fact, a very 
plausible thesis that this is just how “the sciences” began.16   
  
                                                 
13 Quentin Smith and L. Nathan Oaklander, Time, Change, and Freedom: An 
Introduction to Metaphysics (New York: Routledge, 1995), x, 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203980668. 
14 Peter van Inwagen, Metaphysics, 4th ed. (New York: Routledge, 2018), 4, 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429495021. 
15 Ibid., 11. 
16 Ibid. 
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 Honestly, there is no need to continue. If metaphysicians themselves 
(no doubt not all of them, but some at least) admit that their discipline is not 
scientific because it possesses neither the methods nor the knowledge of 
science, but that it would transform into science if it ever suddenly yielded 
“real” knowledge or method, then the case is already made: metaphysics is not 
and does not look in the near future to become science. Nevertheless, the 
problem is much more interesting than this, especially if we ask what exactly 
metaphysicians are doing. A tantalizing clue comes in Staffan Angere’s 
Theory and Reality: Metaphysics as Second Science, where he describes how 
metaphysics and much of philosophy operate. He writes, “A debate is set up 
on certain premises, and these are seldom questioned by the debating parties. 
As the debate proceeds, it takes on a life of its own, and defines its own norms 
for evaluating what is a good or a bad argument.”17 He remarks further, 
 
The best methods for finding out what about this world is true or false 
are empirical, so it is easy to see why traditional metaphysics in the 
vein of the presocratics, Plato, Descartes and Leibniz must fail. 
“Armchair philosophy,” as its detractors call it, is rationalistic, and 
though no metaphysician would categorize herself as an armchair 
philosopher, the fact remains that it is very rare for metaphysicians to 
do actual empirical experiments, or even to design or propose them, 
and so the armchair remains her weapon of choice.18 
 
 It seems that Angere is merely seconding the previous opinions that 
metaphysics does not qualify as science in any way. Additionally, though, he 
is keying us in to what metaphysicians (and arguably many other 
philosophers) are actually doing—starting from certain premises and 
extrapolating the consequences. But where do these premises come from? I 
contend that the great majority, if not all, of metaphysical premises come from 
the surrounding culture and its language. Metaphysics, which pretends to be 
analyzing “the world” or “reality,” is in fact practicing deep cultural 
introspection. The implication is this: the premises and line of reasoning 
within a local metaphysical system would be and are radically different when 
set in a different culture with a different language. 
                                                 
17 Staffan Angere, Theory and Reality: Metaphysics as Second Science (Lund, 
Sweden: Lund University Press, 2010), v. 
18 Ibid., xii. 








 A few examples will have to suffice. Buddhism contains one of the 
world’s most robust metaphysical systems but one that directly contradicts 
Aristotelian/Western philosophy. According to Noa Ronkin’s study of early 
Buddhism, the Buddha “presents a vision of human experience as a transitory 
array of phenomena that are not held together by any underlying substrate.”19 
In other words, there is no substance or essence, the very bread and butter of 
Western metaphysics. The Buddhist doctrine of anātman (no soul/self) posits 
that there is nothing enduring or eternal about individuals and their 
experience. This insight extends to all existing things in the principle of 
pratityasamutpada or paticcasamuppada (dependent origination or 
interdependent co-arising), the idea that there are no permanent underlying 
substances behind reality but that reality originates or arises in each moment 
from the nexus of relations and actions in the preceding moment. It is of 
course not true that every school of Buddhist thought assented to this claim: 
the later Abhidharma literature defended “the notion of ultimate, self-
sufficient elements.”20 And Buddhism in other cultural contexts, such as 
China, absorbed and made room for local concepts like soul and spirit.21 
Struggles over such issues involved differences of interpretation of the sort of 
initial premises that Angere mentioned above; in the words of Ronkin, “The 
development of Buddhist thought hinges upon a long-lasting debate regarding 
the tradition’s notion of the term dhamma, its signification, and of what its 
true nature and its ontological status are.”22 This is a debate that never entered 
the minds or language of Western metaphysicians. 
 Even more exotic languages and cultures did or would have spawned 
even more exotic metaphysics. The Navajo and other Native American 
peoples do not share ancient Greek or medieval European aversion to change. 
Carolyn Epple discovered that for the Navajo, Sa’ah Naaghai Bik’eh Hozho 
(the natural order) was not composed of eternal unchanging essences, the 
bedrock of Western metaphysics. Instead, for them, reality “is a living cycle 
and organizes everything as a cycle; it interconnects everything; through that 
interconnectedness it cycles everything into everything; and it is an ongoing 
cycle, since each male or female has the other (i.e., female or male, 
                                                 
19 Noa Ronkin, Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of a Philosophical Tradition 
(New York: Routledge, 2005), 14, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203537060. 
20 Ibid. 
21 For example, see Jungnok Park, How Buddhism Acquired a Soul on the Way to 
China (Bristol, CT: Equinox Publishing, 2012). 
22 Ronkin, Early Buddhist Metaphysics, 14; italics in original. 
Socio-Historical Examination of Religion and Ministry 





respectively) into which it can cycle.”23 A similar worldview is evident in 
Mongolian shamanism with its ontology based not on being but on transition. 
The physical and spiritual world that Mongolians inhabit and that makes 
shamanism possible is one of “perpetual metamorphosis, malleability, and 
fluidity expressed in the unpredictable movements of wild animals and the 
inchoate trajectories of the shamanic spirits.”24 Indeed, Pedersen recommends 
that we think of spirits—and the shaman and perhaps all humans—less as 
“beings” and more as pure movement, transition, or change—that is, as 
processes rather than persons.   
 Speaking of movement and change, the Aztec philosophy revealed by 
James Maffie depends on a concept of teotl (reality and energy) that “is 
essentially power: continually active, actualized, and actualizing energy-in-
motion. As ever-actualizing power, teotl consists of creating, doing, making, 
changing, effecting, and destroying. Generating, degenerating, and 
regenerating are what teotl does and therefore what teotl is.”25 Teotl in this 
account is not a “first cause” or “prime mover.” And a metaphysics based on 
teotl would reflect its constant “motion-change” in the specific forms of olin 
or oscillating, revolving, arcing motion; malinalli or twisting/spinning; and 
nepantla, perhaps the primary pattern of motion-change, a kind of back-and-
forth, reciprocal, intersecting/uniting motion. Finally, most devastating to 
conventional metaphysics, the Warlpiri (Australian Aboriginal) language 
contains no word for “to be,” so the term “being,” the phrase “being qua 
being,” and titles such as Being and Time and Being and Nothingness would 
be impossible to utter in their tongue. On the contrary, Warlpiri metaphysics 
would begin from the indigenous premise of jukurrpa or “the 
Dreaming/Dreamtime.” 
 It should be apparent by now that metaphysics is not (and cannot be) 
science because a) it does not practice a scientific method or derive scientific 
knowledge; and b) it is not an investigation into nature or reality at all. 
Instead, metaphysics, as commonly practiced, is nothing more than analysis of 
                                                 
23 Carolyn Epple, “Coming to Terms with Navajo ‘Nádleehí’: A Critique of 
‘Berdache,’ ‘Gay,’ ‘Alternate Gender,’ and ‘Two-Spirit,’” American Ethnologist 25, no. 2 
(1998): 276, https://doi.org/10.1525/ae.1998.25.2.267. 
24 Morten Axel Pedersen, Not Quite Shamans: Spirit Worlds and Political Lives in 
Northern Mongolia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 164, 
https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801460937. 
25 James Maffie, Aztec Philosophy: Understanding a World in Motion (Boulder: 
University Press of Colorado, 2014), 23, https://doi.org/10.5876/9781607322238; italics in 
original. 








the local culture and language—in a word, cultural exegesis. Metaphysics 
explores not reality but, unwittingly, how locals think and talk about reality 
and the repercussions of thinking and talking that way. As William Charlton 
puts it, “The words which seem to signify the topics of metaphysics”—
substance, being, cause, dhamma, teotl, or jukurrpa—“apply primarily not to 
things about which we think and speak but to our speech and thought about 
such things; they are words about words, second-order words, though they can 
also be used to give our speech a certain form.”26 In short, metaphysics 
mistakes a worldview for a world. 
 We might ask, in the end, whether it is even possible to practice 
metaphysics in the first place, and some philosophical traditions have 
answered no. Kant placed metaphysics beyond the reach of the senses and, 
therefore, beyond empirical knowledge. On the other side of an impenetrable 
Kantian wall was the noumenon, the thing-in-itself; all we had access to was 
the phenomenon or the thing-as-we-perceive-it. In his famous and fatal 
antinomies, he demonstrated that we could rationalize either position in a 
metaphysical debate but that we could not settle it. Logical positivists went 
further, declaring metaphysical talk to be literally nonsensical, an exercise in 
grammatical but nonsense sentences. Nietzsche dismissed the whole of 
metaphysics as “the history of an error” that began with belief in a “true 
world,” knowable only by the sage or philosopher (like Plato emerging from 
the cave), which then developed into a true world “unattainable, 
indemonstrable, unpromisable” (for him, Kant’s metaphysics), and ending in a 
true world that is merely “an idea which is no longer good for anything, not 
even obligating—an idea which has become useless and superfluous—
consequently, a refuted idea: let us abolish it!”27 While I am not a Kantian 
philosopher or a logical positivist (although I am Nietzschean in many 
regards), the fact that respectable philosophers have despaired of metaphysics 




 Some scholars have classified theology as a branch or culmination of 
metaphysics, including Aristotle himself who opined that theology is highest 
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of the “theoretical philosophies/sciences” since “it deals with the highest of 
existing things,” namely god(s).28 Another way of phrasing this, as 
theologians from Aquinas to Paul Tillich have done, is to understand their god 
as precisely the first principle, the uncaused cause, the primary (or for 
Spinoza, the only) substance, that which is most eternal, unmovable, and 
independent, upon which all else depends—which makes the question of 
god(s) a thoroughly metaphysical question.  If it is true that theology is a 
subset or apotheosis of metaphysics, then by the transitive property, all of our 
criticisms against metaphysics apply equally to theology. It is not and cannot 
be science. 
 Despite this prima facie conclusion, theologians have repeatedly and 
desperately claimed scientific status for their field. In his 1887 Abstract of 
Systematic Theology, James Petrigru Boyce, the first president of the Southern 
Baptist Theological Seminary, asserted that theology (theos + logos) “means 
literally a discourse concerning God but in analogy with other words, as 
geology, chronology and biology, it means the science which treats of God.”29 
Today, The Catholic Encyclopedia clings to this entitlement, stating that by 
adding –ology to theos, theology somehow becomes scientific. It explains, 
 
[Theology is] the science treating of God, subjectively, the scientific 
knowledge of God and Divine things. If defined as the science 
concerning God (doctrina de Deo), the name of theology applies as 
well to the philosophical knowledge of God, which is cast into 
scientific form in natural theology or theodicy.30 
 
 Notwithstanding that adding –ology to a word does not a science 
make (see below), and that there exist many different kinds of theology 
(dogmatic, systematic, natural, ascetical, moral, mystical, pastoral, etc.), as 
well as innumerable theological positions, it is unclear in what specific way 
theology would qualify as science. It produces no quantitative facts, derives 
no laws, advances no hypotheses, offers no theories, posits no mechanisms, 
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makes no predictions, and provides no conditions for falsifiability of any of its 
claims. Indeed, falsifiability is anathema to theology, as Louis Berkof 
confessed in his Systematic Theology: “We start the study of theology with 
two presuppositions, namely (1) that God exists, and (2) that He has revealed 
Himself in His divine Word.”31 There is, of course, no encouragement to 
prove that this god does not exist; the god of theology is not a hypothesis 
(despite Stenger’s title), because a hypothesis is assumed false until proven 
true (i.e. the null hypothesis). In theology, a god is assumed true and subjected 
to no test. Berkof explained, “The Christian accepts the truth of the existence 
of God by faith. But this faith is not a blind faith, but a faith that is based on 
evidence.”32 
 What is this evidence, and how do they arrive at it? Again, Berkof 
remarks, in a dazzlingly circular argument, “The evidence is found primarily 
in Scripture as the inspired Word of God.”33 The great Karl Barth concurred: 
 
Theology is science seeking the knowledge of the Word of God 
spoken in God’s work—science learning in the school of the Holy 
Scripture, which witnesses to the Word of God; science laboring in 
the quest for truth, which is inescapably required of the community 
that is called by the Word of God.34 
 
That is, like metaphysics (but infinitely more so), theology is exegesis, the 
explication of texts. Stephen Paynter admits as much in his work where he 
explains that theology is “concerned with the articulation of the Christian or 
Biblical ‘world-view,’ grounded in exegesis….The world-view articulation is 
typically done by dealing with the Bible’s teachings on a number of more-or-
less standard topics.”35 
 Thus, theology is not a study of the external world but of a worldview 
entextualized in a specific body of texts belonging to only one religious 
tradition. John Frame is more honest when he subtitles his Systematic 
Theology openly as An Introduction to Christian Belief, as is Millard Erickson 
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with his blunt Christian Theology.36 It should go without saying that a science 
is not and cannot be limited to exegesis of books in its field, no matter how 
logical and systematic. No scientist would say, “I am a biologist, I study 
Darwin’s On the Origin of Species.” It is certainly possible to do a science of 
texts, by performing content analysis and comparison and such, which is 
perfectly respectable, but this activity gives us knowledge of the texts and not 
of the world. Even worse, theology decides in advance which texts are worth 
extrapolating (namely, Christian texts) and thus which god(s) are worth 
theorizing (namely, the Christian god). In other words, while theology 
“literally means ‘thinking about God,’” in actual “practice it usually means 
studying the sources of Christian belief like the Bible and the Creeds, and 
exploring the meaning of Christianity for today.”37 The Catholic Encyclopedia 
adds insultingly that “pagan mythology and pagan doctrines about the gods 
must at once be set aside as false theology. The theology of heretics also, so 
far as it contains grave errors, must be excluded.” A less scientific attitude 
could hardly be imagined—except perhaps what Charles Hodge, in his 
Systematic Theology, identified as the “methods” of theology: specifically, 
induction (from the Bible as a “store-house of facts”), speculation (deistic, 
dogmatic, and transcendental), and mysticism!38 
 This all may be scientia—a body of propositions, or of propositions 
about propositions—but it is not science. So, let us agree with Paul Tillich that 
theology, “in spite of its name, is not ‘science of God,’ but it is the logos 
determined interpretation of the symbols of God’s self-manifestation in a 
concrete situation.”39 But the plurality of concrete situations—for our 
purposes, specific historical religio-cultures—and of gods themselves 
guarantees a plethora of diverse and incommensurable theologies. Even within 
Christianity, multiple theologies have spun out conflicting views on their 
deity, Jesus, ritual, icons, and every other conceivable subject as expressed in 
the many controversies and heresies in Christian history (Gnosticism, 
Montanism, Arianism, Pelagianism, Monophysitism, ad infinitum). And, 
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although Christian theologians implicitly ignore or explicitly disqualify other 
religions, if theology is merely an exegesis of Scripture, then it must 
necessarily be a rejection of other sacred texts and other theologies. Islamic 
theology (commonly called ‘ilm al-kalam or, more accurately than the science 
of god(s), “the science of argument/debate”) starts from different sources 
while arguing and debating different points. Most fundamentally, the Islamic 
doctrine of Allah’s oneness (tawhid) excludes notions of their deity’s 
incarnation in the flesh (Allah, after all, neither begets nor is begotten). 
Hinduism has a rich textual repertoire with its own problems to sort out. Other 
religions from ancient Greek, Egyptian, and Norse to Baha’i, Sikhism, and 
Scientology would generate their own situation-specific culture-theologies. 
 Then there are religions with wildly different conceptions of god(s) 
whose theologies would be unrecognizable (and heretical) to Christian 
theologians. Among the Azande of north-central Africa, the god Mbori or 
Mboli was understood as morally neutral and generally uninterested in human 
affairs.40 On the Micronesian island of Ulithi, none of the several gods were 
seen as a creator (the society lacked a creation myth), and the high god Ialulep 
was pictured as a very large, old, and weak character who held the “thread of 
life” of each human and decided when a person would die by breaking the 
thread.41 For the Ainu of northern Japan, the many gods had particular 
assignments, such as the god of house, of ground, of bear, of wolf, or of fox.42  
The foraging Kung or Ju/hoansi of the Kalahari had a great god Gao Na and a 
lesser god Kauha, each with a wife and children in a sky-home; Gao Na 
possessed human form and human tastes and shortcomings (including hunger, 
passion, stupidity, and frustration) and did not inspire awe or reverence—and 
neither god was the prime religious focus of the society.43 Speaking of 
unpleasant gods, the Piaroa of Venezuela recognized two gods, Kuemoi and 
Wahari, the former envisioned as a violent, ugly cannibal.44 Likewise, the 
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Semai of Malaysia, renowned for their nonviolence, were partly kept passive 
by a god who tormented them as a “vicious ludicrous monster” and “a stupid, 
incontinent, violent dupe” who deserved their “frightened distaste.”45 What 
extraordinary theologies scholars of those societies could do! 
 But then, not all religions have god(s) at all, which means that there 
are religions where theology would be meaningless or impossible. In at least 
some iterations of Buddhism, there are no gods or no concern about gods. 
Warlpiri religion contained no gods, only ancestral beings (part human, part 
plant or animal) that lived, fought, and died long ago in the Dreamtime but 
now linger as sources of spiritual energy in the land today. If the Amazonian 
Yanomamo know of any gods, they are much less interested in them than in 
the hekura spirits, sometimes understood as evil beings but also the source of 
shamanic powers. A Yanomamo shaman’s body literally becomes an abode 
for hekura and is a composite of both humanity and spirits, “a total but 
divided being: a fractal multiple ‘one.’”46 Yanomamo religion is not 
conducive to theology, but it would make for some fascinating metaphysics. 
 Finally, while metaphysical concepts like substance and essence are 
speculative, unknown, and potentially unknowable, there is a fair chance that 
there is no such thing as deity in the first place. Like the logical positivists, 
Michael Martin among others has made a strong case that religious language 
(in this case, god-talk) ultimately has no sense: saying “Jesus is the son of 
God” or “God is three persons in one” is equivalent to saying “Two plus two 
equals red” or “Boogah boogah.”47 Even Kant put his god on the other side of 
the Kantian wall, demonstrating in his antinomies that reason could argue just 
as effectively against deity as it could for deity. Arguments for atheism have 
come fast and hot recently, and the existence of god(s) cannot be taken for 
granted anymore, making the very foundation for practicing theology 
questionable. In short: no god(s), then no theology. Theology is rendered a 
discipline without a subject, like unicornology or leprechaunology. Or so one 
would think, but theologians have invented some clever ways to keep doing 
theology without god(s), including “death of God theology” and “anatheism,” 
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or a post-Holocaust theism that is left with “a nonsovereign, nonmetaphysical 
God … whose very powerlessness gives us power.”48 It would still be 
possible, and maybe interesting, to talk about cross-cultural god-beliefs, but it 
would be supremely pointless to “study” god(s). There could be no science of 
god(s), only a science of words about god(s)—exegesis and linguistic analysis 
of talk about god-talk. 
 
After Metaphysics and Theology 
 
 Metaphysics and theology are not science, and they are not about to 
become science. Neither discipline practices a scientific method or emerges 
with scientific knowledge; neither observes, quantifies, hypothesizes, 
theorizes, predicts, tests, or applies. Both are introspection and exegesis of a 
specific language and cultural tradition (metaphysics) or still more narrowly of 
a specific corpus of texts and doctrines within a specific language and cultural 
tradition (theology), which is not what science does. Worse, it is probable, if 
not certain, that metaphysics ponders the unknowable and theology posits the 
imaginary—and the unknowable, the imaginary, and the nonexistent are 
indistinguishable in the end—which cannot be the province of science.  
 The only question that remains is whether there is any way to continue 
doing metaphysics or theology and what they would look like after their 
thorough de-sciencing. Both are possibly useful intellectual exercises, not for 
learning about the world by any means whatsoever but for honing one’s 
logical and literary skills. Indeed, metaphysics actually shares one significant 
quality with science, which is a degree of skepticism and doubt: metaphysics, 
and all of philosophy, is born from reflections like “What is justice really?” or 
“Do we really know what piety is?” This is not to say that the metaphysical 
quest is a scientific one; as philosopher Kevin Schilbrak remarks, 
 
Metaphysical claims seek to describe absolutely all things, or in other 
words they purport to be true under all conditions. Such claims allege 
to be necessary and therefore, if they are true, they cannot conceivably 
be falsified. Because they cannot conceivably be falsified, 
metaphysics cannot be understood as an empirical inquiry that 
                                                 
48 Richard Kearney, Anatheism: Returning to God After God (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010), 66. 
Socio-Historical Examination of Religion and Ministry 





compares hypotheses to states of affairs. Rather, metaphysics [at best] 
is a form of logical inquiry.49 
 
The result of metaphysical inquiry is, thus, interesting but not science. 
Theology, to the contrary, does not even have a veneer of scientificity. Its 
essence and its subject are a creed—it is the exegesis of a specific religious 
creed—and it at no time entertains the possibility that the creed itself is false. 
Falsification would be the death of theology and of all theological careers. 
 But there is a scientific project to do in the arena of metaphysics and 
theology. It is a scientific study of metaphysical and theological statements 
and systems, a comparative metaphysics and a comparative theology, a meta-
metaphysics and a theology-ology, if you will. We have previewed in this 
essay something of what that project would look like. It would expand to 
include other cultures, languages, and religions which are overlooked by 
standard metaphysics and disallowed by standard theology. It would recognize 
the plurality of metaphysicses and theologies (or the lack of the latter in many 
societies). By exploring and comparing multiple metaphysicses and 
theologies, it would implode Aristotelian and Western metaphysics and 
theology, which for too long have had the hubris to appoint themselves the 
only ones. Expanding our minds to embrace what anthropologist A. Irving 
Hallowell decades ago called ethno-metaphysics—the metaphysical thinking 
of different societies, whether or not they “do metaphysics” in a formal and 
professional way—will enable us, compel us, to perceive our own 
metaphysics as another ethno-metaphysics, Western ethno-metaphysics.50 By 
extension, conventional Western/Christian theology will become one among 
many ethno-theologies, with no privileged claim to truth, which we can expect 
will be much more corrosive to theology than to metaphysics. 
 The effect of comparative metaphysics and comparative theology, of a 
science of metaphysicses and theologies, will be, as anthropologist Eduardo 
Viveiros de Castro predicts and welcomes, “the de-Hellenization, the 
decolonization, of thought.”51 Because so far, he continues, “If there’s one 
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thing that Western philosophers are not aware of, it’s the existence of other 
peoples with different intellectual traditions.”52 But if he is correct—and he 
is—that knowledge of “other peoples and of the Other in general are necessary 
conditions of thinking,”53 then metaphysics, theology, and philosophy as a 
whole will finally begin their mission when they take these other human 
experiences and thought-systems seriously. Science can rescue metaphysics 
and theology from irrelevance and error, but neither will be the same, and both 
will be humbled after a good scientific purging. 
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